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Improving Executive/Legislative RelationshipBy
Professor Jibril Aminu
culled from NEWSWATCH, June 12, 2006
Nigeria runs a presidential system which, in structure and theory of
operations, is almost identical to that of the United States. The
Nigerian presidential system started, of course, with the (50-1)
Constitution Drafting Committee inaugurated by General Murtala Muhammed
in 1975. They took the US system almost lock, stock and barrel.
But, the system was not adopted in order to strengthen democracy or to
empower the legislature and the legislator. It was adopted principally
to take the very divisive census issue out of the general elections. It
received a further boost on account of the death, from a dastardly coup
attempt, of the proponent of the idea, General Murtala Mohammed.
When we adopted the US Presidential System in 1979, America was just
over two hundred years old, and had gathered commensurate experience.
Apart from that, our history, when we adopted the system, was very
different from when America adopted hers. We had a Parliamentary system
in the days leading to Independence and in the period after
Independence, until 1966. We also had ancient civilisations with empires
and potentates in the African tradition.
Besides, our religious profile was very different. In addition, to
Christianity and, predominantly, Islam there were also the African
traditional religions. In other words, although the system was the same,
the operators and the environment were both very different.
This type of situation is bound to create different observable results.
It is not only in Nigeria that this was true. Philippines was an old
Polynesian Dutch archipelago. The experience with Spanish colonialism,
the Polynesian culture and the dominant Catholic Church, produced
results different from the US, with, for example, the emergence of a
powerful dictator like Ferdinand Marcos. The same thing is observable in
South Korea, where economic growth and development were not accompanied
by a free and contractual society, with clean, tolerant and accountable
political system and government.
The Second Republic started the new Constitution in 1979, both at the
Federal and State levels. At the centre, President Shehu Shagari was
very democratic and appeared willing to fully observe the provisions of
the Constitution and the rule of law. He took part in fashioning out the
Constitution of 1979 and was elected President through a very vibrant
democratic process, that means tested the key provisions of the
Constitution up to the Supreme Court and affirmed them. He always seems
to me to be saying and acting that he was not afraid of the democratic
process because that was how he came to power. But, he did have some
serious structural problems although he acted as if they did not bother
him. They were an economy that needed to be nursed in the face of a
reckless political class; opposition parties headed by powerful
political colleagues (Waziri Ibrahim, Solomon Lar, Rimi, etc) and elders
Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo and Aminu Kano) who were not
particularly happy with his victory and appeared set to give him and the
system a tough time; and then a military that tasted power, was full of
ambitious young people and never appeared far away.
The presidential system of Second Republic was characterised, and
additionally stressed, by a number of other factors or political
curiosities of no mean order.
The first was the observation made by someone that the presidential
system, as we perceived and practiced it in the Second Republic, could
only be sustained with a lot of money, that is to say, a great economic
boom. When the economy collapsed as a result of the world oil market in
February 1982, the results were predictable.
Second, was the case of the political party leaders who failed in the
presidential election and now had to live with no political office but
who had their party men who were powerful office holders like governors,
senators, ministers etc, and some of whom did not really care about
their party leader anymore. They hijacked the party and it became their
own. Aminu Kano and his PRP and Waziri Ibrahim and his GNPP, and, to
some extent, even Nnamdi Azikiwe and his NPP, all faced these
tribulations. In the parliamentary system, they would have been Members
of the Parliament and in a better position to control their parties.
Third, was the situation where someone should stand election as
representative, senator or governor, and lose and is then made a
powerful minister controlling enormous resources. This obviously created
much envy and polluted the atmosphere between the executive and the
legislature to a similar extent, especially between the successful
legislator and the powerful and influential man he had defeated.
Fourth, were some provisions of the Constitution which created a
national pre-occupation or diversion, namely, impeachment and the
creation of states. One governor and one deputy governor, out of 19
each, were impeached for nothing but trumped up and inflated charges of
misconduct. But, that does not give an indication of the number who were
constantly threatened by their respective legislators, and where
considerably hampered by that. The creation of state and local
government, especially the processes leading to that, took up most of
the time of the legislators and the executives. In the end, no new state
was created. Plenty of local governments were said to have been created.
But, they never really functioned until the coup of 1983 ended the
experiment.
Two further factors which emerged in the presidential system were the
Party Caucus and the Bonic Legislator.
Every party has a caucus and the ruling party has a ruling caucus. The
Shagari Presidential system was very democratic. So, he allowed the
party caucus to be and it was influential, attended by the president and
other top party and government leaders, but chaired by the party
chairman. It was alleged that they reviewed decisions of the Federal
Executive Council particularly on contracts. That seemed to be why a
number of them were detained by the incoming military in 1984, although
the national chairman and quite a number of those they would have wanted
to get their ham-fisted hands on, and on whom they were willing to pay
as much as the cost of a crate, escaped those armed clutches.
The bionic legislator was truly unique in the new presidential system.
In the erstwhile parliamentary system, the legislator was under the
chief whip, with his three line whipping, and collectively, the
legislators did not want to offend the prime minister who could always
have the parliament dissolved with everyone facing dreaded new
elections. The presidential system legislator is free, bionic and
completely on his own. He was boisterous, and in a place like say, an
airport departure lounge, especially if there were complimentary drinks
to be had, you knew everything that went on in the chamber that day if
the honourables were there.
The constitution did not allow the bionic legislator to cross the
carpet. But he could always join with a few and form a faction of the
party and claim that, that was the legitimate entity and they could have
effectively crossed the carpet without saying so.
The Babangida Constitution of 1989, probably to exercise some control
over the bionic legislators, introduced the recall clause for any
legislator. No recall has so far been successful. But, the recall clause
became a convenient tool for the governors, in particular, to harass
legislators. It is due for being struck out of the Constitution because
there are other ways of dealing with erring legislators according to the
rules of their own particular chamber.
For all their boisterousness, the legislatures did not appropriate funds
as, say, the ministers do. They as individuals are really not in
statutory control of public funds. That is why no legislator was jailed
by the Buhari Administration of 1984 only on account of being a
legislator. It is interesting to see if anything has happened to change
that perception and status.
The legislator, unlike the president and governor, has no term limits,
and can be there for a very long time. That is one key to building power
and influence and making a bid for the top executive job. This is very
true in the United States, but is yet to mature in Nigeria.
The Second Republic collapsed for many reasons; military inability to
fit back into civilian life hardships after tasting power, collapse of
the oil market, the commodity that literally fuelled the mono-economy,
natural disasters like the serious draught of 1983, etc. But, excesses
by politicians, their egocentrism, lack of compromise, corruption, dirty
politics and taking the people for granted played a very prominent role
and was the excuse given by the military when they eventually returned.
There were cases of executive, legislative friction, but they were not
responsible for the collapse of the 2nd Republic. In other words, it was
not the constitution, or the presidential system that collapsed. The
reasons were much more mundane. In short, Nigeria successfully embarked
upon the presidential system, but the experiment was cut short by the
excessively poor behaviour of the operators and the unfavourable
environment.
From May 29, 1999, Nigeria has been in what some call the Fourth
Republic, but which others call the Third. We are now towards the end of
the Second Term of the new Republic. It was said that Nigeria was jinxed
and you could never get Civil-Civil Transition to last long. So far,
this one has lasted, and is very much on the way.
Nothing gives a better idea of the stability of a system, than for it to
face very serious crises and survive and continue to grow. The present
system looks and remains rock solid.
In 1999, the presidential system was not new. So everyone was familiar
with its working rudiments.
The National Assembly, from 1999, set about doing its work including law
making, budgeting, oversight functions, confirmation and investigation.
Crises developed over these and they became the centres of controversy,
and some of which went very far, and will be referred to very briefly.
It seems as if the real issues in legislative/executive relationship are
personally driven. The Senate changed its president twice before 2003.
The House had two speakers in the first term. In nearly all cases of
such legislative upheavals, with loss of office, alleged personal
misconduct was what was cited. But, somehow, people tell you that they
could see the hand of the executive there. It is not as if the
legislature was always the victim either. Starting from the House of
Representatives, a very serious attempt was made in 2001 to impeach the
president. The joke that went too far looked like it was going
somewhere, but was fortunately nipped in the bud by the intervention of
two former presidents: Yakubu Gowon and Shehu Shagari.
There was argument over everything. The presidency blocked the release
of funds to the House, which responded with the impeachment threat. The
fact is, someone looking for a fault will always find it. There is
always something that the presidency does, or fails to do, round which a
case for impeachment can be built by those eager to do so. Similarly,
the presidency can always find something wrong with the way the
legislature behaves particularly in managing their own finances. Each
side was gleeful whenever it could score points against the other. The
executive was accused of using the recall clause, in collusion with some
governors, to harass legislators. Peace was only brought about by the
end of the first term, and the respective heads and, in the case of
senate, three quarters of the members, did not return. Again, the
executive was rightly or wrongly fingered on this matter.
It can be said that the first term from 1999 was characterised by the
typical Nigerian over-assertiveness, of one side trying to establish
dominance over the other as the two sides discharged their
constitutional responsibilities. It is fair to say that the problem was
the operators, not the constitution, not the environment. Significantly,
there was no bloodshed, in spite of dramatic moments like when the
senate mace was removed in order to forestall what was perceived to be
an unfriendly meeting.
The crises of the first term were sometimes very acrimonious. But they
served to clearly define areas that needed attention in terms of
improving the relationship between the legislature and the executive and
achieving maturation of the system.
Being part of it since 2003, it will be both difficult and impolitic for
me to comment on what goes on now or to try to analyse it. Suffice to
say, in addressing the various areas one may be able to point to some
where improvements can be made and what is the nature of the improvement
needed in each case. That is one way to face the challenge of the
consolidation of democracy in this dispensation.
The Executive needs to accept that the Constitution provides for the
Legislature and assigns responsibilities to it. The Legislators are not
just a nuisance to slow down things or, put another way, the Executive
should not think that the purpose of the Legislature is to service the
Executive by quickly dealing in a compliant way with whatever the
Executive wants. It should also be appreciated that, at least in the
United Sates, the delays occasioned by legislative processes are not
regarded as evil. They are regarded as essential to the plurality and
diffusion of power, expressing clearly the doctrine of the separation of
powers, in order to stop tyranny and other undemocratic tendencies.
Legislators must have full loyalty first to the country and to the
Legislature. It does not pay when some legislators, particularly those
in key positions, appear to be there only to push the interest of the
Executive, not to talk of outside interest. In particular, rushing
matters through just to appear to be doing the bidding of the Executive
demonstrates failure to appreciate the essence of the presidential
system.
The party system must be strengthened. Division in the Legislature along
party lines is considered the most healthy in order to give plurality a
strong say. A legislature cannot demote party affiliation and pretend to
be democratic.
The party itself is not helping democracy when it becomes little more
than an agent of the Executive, stressing party loyalty and discipline
only to compel the Legislature to do the bidding of the Executive.
Legislators are to concentrate on their work and their dignity. Their
constituency projects should be substantially and promptly funded. These
projects spread development into nooks and crannies, they thus
accelerate national development. If they are given generous allocation
for constituency projects, legislators will reduce their unwholesome
practice of going to the ministers in their offices looking for little
personal and constituency favours, a situation fraught with the danger
of ruining relations between the Executive and the Legislature.
Whatever it is, legislators need to shun questionable money no matter
from what source. The Executive must not be used to the idea of
compromising the
Legislature only to turn around and declare them corrupt.
Both the Executive and the Legislature need to understand that, in the
presidential system, the legislature is in charge of the money. The
Executive is in charge of its approved budget. Any monies outside this
require the Legislature to approve. The Legislature must know where
every kobo is and is entitled to know how every kobo is spent. They
should not collude with the Executive, as happens in some states, to
loot.
The National Assembly should be as independent of the Executive as
possible. This should include direct, first line charge for their
budget, abolition of the recall clause which is only a tool in the hands
of governors and other executives to harass legislators, and according
the legislators an ungrudging recognition of their true protocol status
as elected representatives of the people. The Executive needs to
recognise the critical role of legislators when requiring a law,
ratifying a treaty or screening of some political appointees to some
public offices. Similarly, in all major state undertakings, the
legislators need to be consulted or included because, for most projects
or programmes to succeed, they may need some kind of legislation. The
legislators also require working space and manpower. Before comments are
made about how expensive they are, the suites and staff available to the
American Senators and Congressmen should first be studied. It would be
quite instructive.
There are structures needed to raise the quality of legislation and the
legislator's work. The American General Accounting Office, and Office of
Management and Budget, OMB, increase the data and advice available to
the legislators and will greatly enhance their productivity. The
facilities are cost effective.
The Committees need to be accorded greater respect. While they must be
enjoined to do their work with due diligence, the committees need to be
allowed much latitude, on deciding the right to block some bills or
decisions for good cause. A committee should not be asked to report in
so many weeks if it appears that they will not be able to do so, or that
some constitution is cut out because of expedience.
When the Senate indicates that it is not willing to clear some appointee
following a screening exercise, the matter must not be pushed by the
Executive with the same candidate returned over and over again until
approved. In other words "LET GO" is a good mutual policy of how to
respect each other.
Neither side should take pleasure in propagating scandals on the other.
They should avoid speaking ill of each other. The Executive should not
use its enormous direct control of resources to spread stories in the
media and civil society in general, with the view to maligning the
legislature, particularly collectively.
On law making, the Executive must act on private members bills and
resolutions. Hardly any private members bill has been signed into law.
There is little evidence that much notice is taken of even formal
Resolution of the National Assembly except those that the Executive may
be impeached in the future. Most problems appear to arise from little
more than insufficient information and consultation over the very
dynamic state of government liquidity, particularly in an unstable
economy, like one relying on one commodity, oil. Resentment also arises
from a prejudiced mindset in whatever direction for whatever reasons.
The Executive will need to be transparent about all government revenues
and expenditure. There is a popular notion that not enough its known
about what goes on. This idea of the Accountant-General to look after
the Federal Account and a Federal Treasurer to look after the Federal
Consolidated Revenue Fund must be pursued and actualised, Otherwise,
suspicious will remain.
The federal and state executives must give up immunity in criminal
offences. The legislators do not have immunity except while speaking in
the Chamber. No one should have the immunity to commit criminal offences
with impunity.
The challenge of consolidating democracy is for the system to work, and
for the operators to try to get it to work in spite of the divergent
history and culture. If we get it to work, like it does in the United
States, from where we borrowed it, democracy will be very difficult to
shake in his land.
*Professor Aminu is senator, Adamawa Central Senatorial District,
National Assembly, Abuja. The foregoing are excepts from his lecture
marking The Third Oba Okunade Sijuwade Distinguished Guest Lecture, at
OAU, Ife, recently.
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